Necesitamos una taxonomía nueva del inconsciente? Algunas consideracio-nes psicoanalíticas, psicológicas, neurocientíficas y filosóficas

To overcome the differences between Freudian psychoanalysis, contemporary psychology, and neurosciences concerning the separation/continuity between consciousness and unconscious, in this paper I would like to suggest a new conceptualization. A distinction between «the conscious in principle», i.e. all the states that in principle can have the possibility to be conscious, and «the unconscious in princi-ple», i.e. the states that cannot become conscious, sometimes just because they do not have any neu-rofunctional means to access consciousness, or have been codified in an inadequate form to be translated into consciousness, or because they concern processing that cannot be represented. Such a distinction draws on data resulting from neuroscientific research focusing on the resting state activity and the cortical midline structures that are supposed to become activated through self-relatedness of input stimuli, thus allowing an access to dynamically unconscious states that potentially could move into consciousness and connect the Self, the organism, and the environment. This distinction could also be relevant for psychoanalysis and philosophy, as it may open the possibility to overcome the gap between mind and brain, and therefore between mental and cerebral states.