Abstract
Judicial reform is a major platform of President Tsai’s 2016 campaign. She established Judicial Reform Council after her election. The council concluded a significant downsize of Taiwanese Supreme Court(s) system (judges and chambers alike) to resolve conflicting decisions between chambers within the current Supreme Court(s). Such downsize should be limited by, first, constitutionality, and second, its policy implication on the judiciary as well as people’s right to legal remedy, although the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) enjoys a wide range of discretion in principle. To propose policy suggestion that balances people’s legal remedy right and the need of resolving conflicting legal decisions, this article makes reference to American experience for its abundant normative analysis as well as behavioral research.
Translated title of the contribution | The Best Size for Taiwanese Supreme Court(s): A Constitutional Analysis Incorporates Behavioral Scientific Perspective |
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Original language | Chinese (Traditional) |
Pages (from-to) | 139-173 |
Number of pages | 35 |
Journal | 憲政時代 |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2018 |
Keywords
- Judicial Reform
- Supreme Court
- Right to Legal Remedy
- Behavioral Science