Disjunctivism and Theories of Action

‘Content’ continues to be the core subject of contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. The study of content in recent years develops in three closely interrelated directions: the problem of normativity, internalist/externalist debate, and perceptual content. The third direction is further divided into: the disjunctivism debate and the problem whether empirical content is representational. In the past decade, my research has been around Wittgenstein, Davidson, Brandom, and McDowell. It is mainly on aforementioned fields, especially, the first, the second and the second of the third directions. Disjunctivism is no strange to me and I have supervised a MA thesis on the subject. But it is true that disjunctivism remains a territory required thorough exploration in the map of my research. There is few, if any, researches on disjunctivism here in Taiwan. It is urgent to start one for such an important topic. I hope that my research could not only develop the field here but also thereby make some contributions on the international level. Disjunctivism has been focused on perceptual content. Research papers accumulate rapidly. It is a red sea. But there is ‘blue sea’ in front of the red sea. It is ‘disjunctivism on action,’ which is still in its infancy. I think there is more chance to make the international contribution that I hope for.